The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. Simultaneously, U.S. SIGINT was placed on increased alert to monitor indications of future North Vietnamese threats to the Desoto Missions, and additional air and naval forces were deployed to the Western Pacific. The NSA report is revealing. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. . Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. We still seek no wider war.. ThoughtCo. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. no isolated event. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. 3. 14. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. Suns and Stars It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. (2021, February 16). Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. The Health Conspiracy. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. The United States denied involvement. . The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear.
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